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Imagine that you are a member of the armed forces on active duty who 
happens to have a bit too much to drink during an on-base party.  A fellow 
service member helps you to your barracks, returns later, and rapes you.  
You later find out that he has a prior felony assault conviction, which the 
military failed to discover during his enlistment.  You sue the government 
for the military’s negligence in hiring your attacker.  However, you are 
unable to recover solely because you are an active duty service member. 
These facts are similar to those of Gonzalez v. United States Air Force, 
an unpublished decision rendered by the Tenth Circuit.1  The court 
dismissed the suit under the doctrine the Supreme Court announced in 
Feres v. United States, which states that the government is not liable under 
the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) for injuries incurred by military 
members on active duty providing that the injuries arose out of activities 
incident to service.2  Courts bar virtually every tort claim through an 
expanded meaning of the Feres Doctrine, which finds that almost every 
injury that occurs to a service member arises directly out of his or her 
military service.3  According to judicial interpretations, service-related 
injuries include those that occur when a military member is on active duty, 
subject to military discipline, or while performing a recreational activity 
 1. See 88 Fed. Appx. 371, 372-73 (10th Cir. 2004) (stating that a service member, 
Kerry Nazario, raped the plaintiff, Nicolette Gonzalez, after helping her back to her barracks 
as she had been drinking at an on-base party). 
 2. See id. at 375 (dismissing the claim under the Feres Doctrine because the injury 
occurred while the plaintiff was on active duty and subject to military discipline); see also 
Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950) (preventing active military members from 
bringing tort claims against the federal government for injuries that arose out of service). 
 3. See United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 703 (1987) [hereinafter Johnson I] 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that Feres was incorrect because it created “unfairness and 
irrationality” in later decisions); see also Pringle v. United States, 208 F.3d 1220, 1223-24 
(10th Cir. 2000) (quoting Persons v. United States, 925 F.2d 292, 296 n.7 (9th Cir. 1991)) 
(noting that courts have broadened Feres to bar any claim even slightly related to a 
plaintiff’s status as a military member, even if the claim does not appear to relate to military 
decisions). 
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that relates to military service.4
This Comment’s analysis focuses on the facts that arose in Gonzalez and 
argues that a more appropriate holding would have provided the plaintiff 
with a remedy.5  Part I of this Comment provides a brief background of 
both the FTCA and the Feres Doctrine and introduces the plaintiff’s claim 
in Gonzalez and the decision of the Tenth Circuit.6  Part II analyzes how 
civilian courts have expanded the meaning behind the Feres Doctrine 
dramatically, and argues that Feres should not have barred the plaintiff’s 
claim in Gonzalez.7  Part II further discusses why the discretionary function 
and intentional tort exceptions to the FTCA should not bar the plaintiff’s 
claim and explains why the Ninth Circuit’s negligent hiring analysis would 
have been appropriate in Gonzalez.8  This Comment concludes that the 
Tenth Circuit could have decided Gonzalez differently and allowed the 
plaintiff the opportunity to argue the merits of her case had the court not 
dismissed the case on a jurisdictional technicality.9
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  The Federal Tort Claims Act and its Exceptions 
One possible basis for civil redress for sexual assault claims that occur in 
the military is under the FTCA.10  At common law, the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity shielded the federal government from liability for torts 
committed by federal employees.11  In response to the many private bills 
 4. See Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 375-76 (explaining that Feres bars recovery for 
incidents occurring during social and recreational activities that service members engage in 
and also those injuries that occur when a service member is subject to military discipline, 
such as attending an on-base party). 
 5. See id. at 375 (dismissing the claim under Feres for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction and leaving the plaintiff without a remedy in civilian courts, since the Federal 
Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) provides for plaintiffs to bring cases only in federal court); see 
also Diane H. Mazur, Rehnquist’s Vietnam: Constitutional Separatism and the Stealth 
Advance of Martial Law, 77 IND. L.J. 701, 751 (2002) (arguing that victims of sexual 
harassment usually are left without much of a remedy through the military justice process). 
 6. See infra Part I (explaining the relevant case law and statutes related to Gonzalez 
and the FTCA). 
 7. See infra Part II (arguing that the court was incorrect in its analysis as it focused on 
the moment of the injury and not on the negligence). 
 8. See infra Part II (arguing that the Supreme Court should grant certiorari to a 
negligent hiring case and decide the case in favor of the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the 
FTCA). 
 9. See infra pp. 667-68 (concluding that the over-expanded application of Feres and 
the majority viewpoint of the intentional tort exception frustrate the purpose of the FTCA). 
 10. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2005) (granting a limited waiver of sovereign immunity 
for claims by federal workers against the government for torts that arise while the 
employees are acting within the scope of their employment); see also Dalehite v. United 
States, 346 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1953) (stating that one of the purposes of the FTCA is to provide 
a remedy to persons injured due to the actions of federal employees). 
 11. See William P. Kratzke, Some Recommendations Concerning Tort Liability of 
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that attempted to provide an avenue for redress for those injured by federal 
employees, Congress passed the FTCA.12  The FTCA grants a limited 
waiver of the government’s sovereign immunity and holds the government 
liable for torts committed by federal employees.13  However, the FTCA 
contains specific exceptions to this waiver, which include: (1) the 
discretionary function exception; (2) the intentional tort exception; and (3) 
the exception for claims that arise out of combat.14  These exceptions, 
among others, protect certain government activities from judicial 
questioning.15  In early cases, courts found that Congress intended for 
members of the armed forces to have the ability to sue the federal 
government for claims of negligence under the FTCA.16  The specificity 
within the language of the FTCA led courts to believe that Congress 
intended it to apply directly to those in active duty, as long as their claims 
did not fall under one of the exceptions to the FTCA.17
The Supreme Court first addressed the purpose behind the FTCA in 
Brooks v. United States and found that the statute allowed active duty 
service members to recover monetary damages from the federal 
government based upon its language and framework.18  The Court found 
that the plaintiffs could recover damages because their injuries did not 
occur incident to service, as they were not obeying military orders at the 
Government and Its Employees for Torts and Constitutional Torts, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 
1105, 1107 (1996) (explaining that regardless of the merits of the claim, under the doctrine 
of sovereign immunity, no one could sue the government for torts committed by its 
employees). 
 12. See id. (stating that Congress passed the FTCA because it became too burdened by 
the numerous private bills). 
 13. See § 1346(b) (allowing plaintiffs to file suit against the government in federal court 
for a federal employee’s negligence in circumstances where “the United States, if a private 
person, would be liable to the claimant”); 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (2005) (defining “employees” to 
include members of the military); see also Coe v. United States, 502 F. Supp. 881, 885 (D. 
Or. 1980) (stating that § 1346(b) of the FTCA waives sovereign immunity of the federal 
government only to the extent that a plaintiff could hold a private person liable). 
 14. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)-(n) (2005) (excepting numerous other issues from the 
waiver of the government’s sovereign immunity). 
 15. See Kratzke, supra note 11, at 1113-14 (explaining that the legislative history of the 
FTCA provides little explanation for having all these exceptions, beyond shielding the 
government from judicial critique). 
 16. See, e.g., Alansky v. Northwest Airlines, 77 F. Supp. 556, 558 (D. Mont. 1948) 
(detailing a history of the government providing support for soldiers and, therefore, 
doubting that Congress would have changed that policy with the FTCA); Samson v. United 
States, 79 F. Supp. 406, 409 (S.D.N.Y. 1947) (finding that Congress’s repeal of the Military 
Claims Act indicated its intent for soldiers to be able to seek redress under the FTCA). 
 17. See Alansky, 77 F. Supp. at 558 (finding that the explicit language within the FTCA 
specifically defines members of the military as “employees”); see also § 2680(a)-(n) 
(excepting certain claims from the waiver of sovereign immunity, such as when it is based 
on a discretionary function, is an intentional tort, is combat-related, or occurs in a foreign 
country). 
 18. See 337 U.S. 49, 50 (1949) (explaining that two servicemen and their father were 
riding in a vehicle on a public road when a military truck struck the vehicle, which was 
stopped at a stop sign, killing one and severely injuring the other two plaintiffs). 
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time of their injuries.19  The Court, however, failed to address how it would 
decide the case if the injury had arisen incident to service.20
1.  The Discretionary Function Exception Bars Claims that Allege 
Negligence in Decisions Made by Federal Employees 
The FTCA’s discretionary function exception bars claims based on the 
government’s negligence in failing to perform a duty based on a 
discretionary function, which is a decision made using judgment.21  In 
Dalehite v. United States, the Supreme Court created a distinction between 
activities at a planning level and those at an operational level.22  Decisions 
at the planning level inherently involve discretion, as they are decisions 
that attempt to plan a course of action, and protect the government from 
liability.23  Decisions at the operational level, however, are not 
discretionary, because they are merely decisions that put the plan into 
effect.24
Recent Supreme Court jurisprudence has created a two-step process to 
determine whether the discretionary function exception applies.25  The first 
prong questions whether the decision required any element of choice on the 
part of the employee.26  If regulations bound the employee’s course of 
action, thereby leaving the employee with no discretion in making his 
 19. See id. at 52 (finding that the plaintiff’s military service alone was irrelevant to the 
car accident which caused the injuries). 
 20. See id. (indicating that the result might be different if the injury had occurred due to 
service-related activities, but specifically declining to answer that question). 
 21. See § 2680(a) (stating that the government is exempt from liability for any claim 
based upon a decision made by a federal employee, where the employee was using his own 
discretion). 
 22. See 346 U.S. at 35-36 (stating that persons make discretionary decisions at the 
planning level because such decisions are policy judgments that extend to the scheduling 
and initiation of activities, while decisions at the operational level are not discretionary and, 
therefore, subject the government to liability); see also United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 
U.S. 797, 812-13 (1984) (noting that Dalehite still stands as a valid interpretation of the 
discretionary function exception despite analysis that may be to the contrary). 
 23. See Bryson v. United States, 463 F. Supp. 908, 911 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (providing an 
example of an action at the planning level as the creation of the standards used to judge 
military enlistees). 
 24. See id. at 912 (explaining that the decision to enlist a specific applicant into the 
military is a decision at the operational level, and thus makes the government liable). 
 25. See William P. Kratzke, The Supreme Court's Recent Overhaul of the Discretionary 
Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1, 12-23 (1993) 
(stating that the Supreme Court shaped the discretionary function test in a recent trilogy of 
decisions, Varig Airlines, Berkovitz v. United States and United States v. Gaubert). 
 26. See Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988) (explaining that the 
language of the exception mandates this prong because if an element of choice exists in the 
employee’s decision-making, this inherently involves discretion and does not subject the 
government to liability); see also United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 324 (1991) 
(explaining that where a regulation proscribed certain conduct, and the employee followed 
this regulation, there is no liability because the employee did not use any discretion).  
However, if the employee performs contrary to its requirements, then the government is 
liable.  Id. 
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decision, then the exception does not apply and the government is subject 
to potential liability.27  The second prong questions whether the decision 
involved is the type of action that Congress intended to shield from 
liability.28  This step determines whether the application of the exception 
protects against the questioning of certain types of decisions, such as those 
grounded in social, economic or political policy.29
2.  The Intentional Tort Exception Prohibits Claims that Allege the 
Occurrence of an Assault or Battery 
Although the FTCA waives the sovereign immunity of the federal 
government in tort suits, it expressly prevents a plaintiff from bringing a 
suit alleging injury from assault and battery.30  As a way to circumvent the 
intentional tort suit bar, plaintiffs in the past attempted to couch their 
assault claims as ones of negligence on the part of the government.31  In 
response, courts began to analyze the substance of the claim to determine 
whether it arose out of the government’s negligence or out of an actual 
assault or battery.32  In United States v. Shearer, the Supreme Court held 
that the intentional tort exception barred not only those claims that alleged 
injury caused by an assault or battery directly, but also those claims that 
 27. See Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536 (stating that where there are regulations, the 
employee is bound to follow them and, therefore, the conduct of the employee is not based 
on choice). 
 28. See Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 813 (explaining that it is the nature of the actions 
taken by the employee that is the relevant focus, not the fact that the employee works for the 
government). 
 29. See id. at 813-14 (explaining that, under this exception, Congress intended to 
exempt from judicial scrutiny certain legislative and administrative decisions in order to 
protect the independence of the branches).  The purpose of protecting against inquiry into 
certain types of decisions was to ensure that courts did not subject the government’s 
decisions regulating the conduct of private persons to liability.  Id. 
 30. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2005) (barring intentional tort claims arising from 
“assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, 
libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights”); see also 
Jablonski v. United States, 712 F.2d 391, 395 (9th Cir. 1983) (articulating that the 
underlying policy behind the intentional tort exception is to “insulate the government from 
liability” for torts that it was “powerless to prevent”). 
 31. See, e.g., United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 53-55 (1985) (alleging that the 
military was negligent in its supervision of a serviceman who had committed manslaughter 
while on active duty, yet whom the military had transferred to another base upon his release 
from prison).  After his transfer, the perpetrator kidnapped and murdered the plaintiff’s son.  
Id.  The plaintiff further alleged that the military had a duty to warn others of the 
perpetrator’s predisposition to commit violence.  Id. 
 32. See, e.g., Bryson, 463 F. Supp. at 912-13 (noting cases from the Third and Fifth 
Circuits where the courts refused to dismiss the negligence claim where the injuries arose 
from an employee’s negligent actions despite the fact that the injuries originally stemmed 
from an assault and battery); see also Coffey v. United States, 387 F. Supp. 539, 540 (D. 
Conn. 1975) (explaining that the plaintiff’s claim alleged that the Marine Guard who shot 
him was negligent in discharging his gun).  The court held that the plaintiff’s complaint fell 
under the intentional tort exception because he disguised his claim as one based on 
negligence, as it was clear from the substance of the claim that it focused on the assault, 
rather than on negligence.  Id. 
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alleged an injury caused by negligence, despite the injury physically 
occurring from an assault or battery.33
The Court felt that broad immunity better served the purpose behind the 
FTCA as Congress never intended for the government to be liable for 
intentional torts committed by its employees.34  By finding that the 
intentional tort exception encompassed claims of negligence, even if the 
assault or battery was the basis of the claim, the Court expanded the notion 
of the intentional tort exception.35  Even though it is only a plurality 
opinion, the Shearer holding has prevailed in the majority of circuits.36
B.  Negligent Hiring 
An employer has a duty to exercise due care in the hiring of employees, 
and if the employer breaches this duty, a court may hold the employer 
liable for injuries caused by a negligently hired employee.37  As the 
Supreme Court has not addressed this issue in relation to the military, the 
circuits lack guidance on whether they can analyze negligent hiring claims 
under the FTCA.38  The majority of the circuits have held that the 
intentional tort exception bars most negligent hiring claims because but for 
the intentional tort, the claim itself never would have occurred.39  However, 
 33. See 473 U.S. at 55-56 (explaining that the language “arising out of” encompasses 
negligence claims, as the FTCA protects the government from being liable for assaults and 
batteries committed by its employees).  The Court further explained that the lack of 
supervision could not be the basis for the government’s liability.  Id. 
 34. See id. at 55 (indicating that the legislative history of the FTCA made it clear that 
courts should not hold the government liable for intentional acts, because the government 
was not in a position to prevent the assaults and batteries of its employees). 
 35. See id. (prohibiting a negligent supervision claim under the language of § 2680(h) 
because the legislative history indicated that courts should read the statute broadly); see also 
Franklin v. United States, 992 F.2d 1492, 1498 (10th Cir. 1993) (finding that the intentional 
tort exception bars a claim that stems originally from an intentional tort, even if the claim is 
for negligence). 
 36. See, e.g., Franklin, 992 F.2d at 1498 (adopting the plurality reasoning in Shearer 
and finding that the exception barred any claim that arose from assault and battery, despite 
any negligence on the part of the government); Guccione v. United States, 847 F.2d 1031, 
1034 (2d Cir. 1988) (noting that the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Tenth Circuits have adopted the 
broad view of Shearer and similarly have barred negligence claims that arose from 
intentional torts).  But see Bennett v. United States, 803 F.2d 1502, 1503 (9th Cir. 1986) 
(refusing to recognize the Shearer analysis as binding because the discussion came from a 
plurality and, therefore, lacks precedential value).  The court held that a claim based on an 
injury arising from an assault and battery did not excuse the government’s negligence.  Id. 
 37. See, e.g., Ponticas v. K.M.S. Invs., 331 N.W.2d 907, 910 n.4 (Minn. 1983) (listing 
some of the states that have recognized negligent hiring claims, including Alaska, 
California, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, 
Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas 
and Tennessee). 
 38. Compare Senger v. United States, 103 F.3d 1437, 1441 (9th Cir. 1996) (refusing to 
adopt the Shearer reasoning regarding negligent hiring claims because it is only a plurality 
opinion with little precedential force), with Guccione, 847 F.2d at 1034 (adopting the 
reasoning in Shearer and stating that the language of the exception applies broadly enough 
to bar claims that stem from negligence but arise directly out of an intentional tort). 
 39. See, e.g., Garcia v. United States, 776 F.2d 116, 118 (5th Cir. 1985) (arguing that a 
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the Ninth Circuit has allowed negligent hiring claims to be heard, basing its 
reasoning on the nature of the FTCA itself, and refusing to adopt the 
Shearer plurality opinion.40  Instead, the Ninth Circuit has stated that 
claims alleging negligent hiring on the part of the government that are 
independent from the assault or battery, and in which the negligence is the 
proximate cause of the injury, could give rise to liability.41
C.  Affirmative Duties 
The intentional tort exception usually does not bar claims that allege that 
the government employer had an affirmative duty to the plaintiff and knew 
or should have known that an employee was likely to commit an injurious 
act.42  If the injury to the plaintiff was a foreseeable consequence of the 
government’s negligence, courts do not consider the assault or battery a 
supervening act that nullifies the government’s negligence.43  In Sheridan 
v. United States, the Supreme Court held that there are situations where a 
negligent act by a government employee is enough to hold the government 
liable, provided that an affirmative duty existed on the part of the 
government prior to the negligence.44  This liability exists even if an assault 
or battery caused the plaintiff’s injury because the military had an 
affirmative duty to protect the plaintiff.45  The Court found that the 
government has a duty to prevent a foreseeably dangerous person from 
injuring another, regardless of the perpetrator’s military status or his intent 
claim based on a negligent act arises from an assault, not from the negligence itself, and is 
therefore barred under the FTCA).  See generally Guccione, 847 F.2d at 1034 (noting that 
many of the circuits, including the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Tenth, have interpreted Shearer 
to bar negligent hiring claims because of the claim’s basis in an assault). 
 40. See Senger, 103 F.3d at 1441 (arguing that the purpose of the FTCA is to provide a 
forum for broad relief for negligent tort actions committed by government employees); see 
also Bennett, 803 F.2d at 1504 (finding that the purpose of the FTCA is not to grant broad 
immunity to the government, but is instead to allow for a wide range of federal employees 
to bring claims). 
 41. See Senger, 103 F.3d at 1441 (finding that the government could be held liable for 
negligently hiring and supervising a postal worker and for failing to warn others of the 
postal worker’s dangerous tendencies, because the government knew or should have known 
of the postal worker’s past actions).  The court remanded this case for further consideration 
on the merits, finding that the district court failed to analyze the claim correctly.  Id. 
 42. See, e.g., Gibson v. United States, 457 F.2d 1391, 1394 (3d Cir. 1972) (stating that 
if the government undertakes a duty to care for or instruct others, it assumes an affirmative 
duty to protect its employees from those who are violent). 
 43. See id. at 1395 (finding that courts could hold the government liable when it 
assumed a duty to care for and instruct others). 
 44. See 487 U.S. 392, 401 (1988) (holding the government liable for an intentional 
assault with a firearm by a drunken serviceman because the military had assumed an 
affirmative duty to care for its service members and neglected to uphold this duty).  The 
Court found that the military had adopted regulations prohibiting firearms on-base and 
various service members failed to report the presence of a firearm or to care for the visibly 
drunk serviceman with the firearm.  Id. 
 45. See id. at 403 (finding that liability exists regardless of the military status of the 
perpetrator, thereby declining to address negligent hiring). 
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to commit the assault.46  Following Sheridan, courts began to adopt this 
rationale by stating that if the government had an affirmative duty to 
protect the plaintiff prior to the assault, the intentional tort exception does 
not bar the claim.47
D.  The Feres Doctrine 
In Feres v. United States, the Supreme Court addressed the question it 
reserved in Brooks48 and examined whether the FTCA was applicable to 
injuries that occurred incident to service.49  The Court held that the 
government was not liable under the FTCA for injuries military members 
incurred while on active duty as long as they arose out of or occurred in the 
course of activity “incident to service.”50  Feres, the Court found, was 
factually a different case than Brooks, because the Brooks plaintiff was not 
on active duty at the time of his injury and because the military had 
discharged him before he filed suit.51
The Court in Feres articulated three rationales for barring claims that 
arise in the course of activity incident to service: (1) the location where the 
plaintiff brings the tort claim should not govern the law that courts apply in 
the suit; (2) the relationship between the military and the United States 
Government is uniquely federal and, therefore, should be exempt from 
judicial inquiry; and (3) most military-related claims are covered by other 
statutory compensation systems.52  Using these rationales, the Court denied 
relief to the plaintiffs, further stating that the FTCA did not provide a new 
avenue of liability for military members, and that no current law existed 
 46. See id. at 400-03 (holding the government liable based on the service member’s 
negligence in allowing for the assault to occur).  The Court found it irrelevant that the 
drunken serviceman’s actions resulted in an intentional assault.  Id. 
 47. See, e.g., Doe v. United States, 838 F.2d 220, 222-23 (7th Cir. 1988) (explaining 
that if a duty existed prior to the assault, the assault is fully independent from any claim of 
negligence); see also Loritts v. United States, 489 F. Supp. 1030, 1031-32 (D. Mass. 1980) 
(finding the government negligent in failing to ensure the safety of females invited to West 
Point, despite the fact that it voluntarily had assumed this duty).  This negligence led to the 
plaintiff’s rape.  Id. 
 48. See Brooks, 337 U.S. at 52 (declining to consider the outcome of a situation where 
the injury arose out of combatant activities, as that was not the issue presented). 
 49. See Feres, 340 U.S. at 135 (consolidating three different cases that raised similar 
issues relating to the injuries of service members that occurred while on active duty). 
 50. See id. at 146 (explaining that injuries that occur “incident to service” are those that 
arise while performing a military duty, under military orders or on a military mission). 
 51. Compare id. at 136-37 (noting that the plaintiff was carrying out his orders by 
remaining in his barracks with an unsafe heating device), with Brooks, 337 U.S. at 50 
(noting the plaintiff’s non-military status at the time of the suit, and indicating that he was 
driving along a public highway and under no compulsion or duty). 
 52. See Feres, 340 U.S. at 142-46 (justifying the reasons that military members cannot 
sue the government for injuries that arise incident to service).  The Court further stated that 
it was unable to find any case law that allowed a private individual to sue for injuries similar 
to those in the case at bar.  Id. at 141-42. 
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that allowed military members to sue their superiors for negligence.53
In the years after Feres, courts began to focus their reasoning on the 
military status of the plaintiff at the time of the suit, rather than on his or 
her status when the injury originally occurred,54 while continuing to affirm 
the use of the “incident to service” rationale.55  The Ninth Circuit laid out 
four factors to use as guideposts, not definitively, to determine whether an 
injury occurred “incident to service”: (1) the location where the negligent 
act occurred; (2) whether the victim was on duty when the negligent act 
occurred; (3) whether the victim accrued any benefits as a service member 
at the time of injury; and (4) the nature of the victim’s activities at the time 
of the negligent act.56  Further, courts have articulated that there must be a 
case-by-case analysis to determine whether precluding the claim would 
serve the purpose behind the Feres Doctrine.57  However, the single 
prevailing concern that guides courts in their determination that Feres bars 
tort claims by service members is the fear that military order and discipline 
might be undermined if military personnel were permitted to sue for 
wrongful conduct.58
 53. See id. at 146 (barring the claim because Congress did not intend to create a new 
statutory scheme based on state law for service-related injuries when federal law has always 
governed these situations). 
 54. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954) (reasoning that Feres 
did not bar the suit because his civilian status at the time of the suit exempted it from the 
“incident to service” analysis); see also Watt v. United States, 246 F. Supp. 386, 388 
(E.D.N.Y. 1965) (finding that Feres did not bar the claim of a retired soldier injured in a 
military hospital because the injury did not occur while he was on active duty; thus, it was 
not incident to service).  But see Harten v. Coons, 502 F.2d 1363, 1365 (10th Cir. 1974) 
(stating that the relevant inquiry to determine whether an injury is incident to service is the 
plaintiff’s status at the time of injury). 
 55. See Costo v. United States, 248 F.3d 863, 867 (9th Cir. 2001) (indicating that the 
cases that interpret “incident to service” are irreconcilable); see also Mariano v. United 
States, 444 F. Supp. 316, 319-20 (E.D. Va. 1977) (finding “incident to service” to be a 
broad term, not restricted to the military context). 
 56. See Dreier v. United States, 106 F.3d 844, 848 (9th Cir. 1996) (explaining that it 
cannot reconcile prior Feres decisions and, therefore, courts should not use bright line rules 
to determine whether the Doctrine bars the claim).  Furthermore, the court stated that the 
best way to determine whether Feres bars the claim is a comparison to prior decisions.  Id. 
at 849. 
 57. See, e.g., Stanley v. United States, 786 F.2d 1490, 1499 (11th Cir. 1986) (indicating 
that the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation of Feres and existing precedent does not bar an 
FTCA suit merely because the plaintiff’s injuries occurred while carrying out military-
related orders). 
 58. See Johnson I, 481 U.S. at 691 (indicating that civilian court judgments would 
undermine a service member’s duty to the military because it would disrupt military 
discipline); see also Moore v. Pa. Dep’t of Military & Veterans Affairs, 216 F. Supp. 2d 
446, 450 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (highlighting the “special status of the military,” thus exempting it 
from the civilian judicial system).  But see Mazur, supra note 5, at 718 & n.101 (noting that 
Scalia’s dissent in Johnson I argued that the protection of military order and discipline was a 
“‘later-conceived-of’ rationale” that did not exist at the time the Court decided Feres). 
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E.  Gonzalez v. United States Air Force 
In 1999, a fellow Air Force member, Kerry Nazario, raped 
servicewoman Nicolette Gonzalez while she was sleeping in her barracks 
after an on-base party in Oklahoma.59  The Air Force court-martialed her 
attacker, and Gonzalez brought suit against the United States Government, 
alleging numerous negligent acts on the part of the military.60  The Tenth 
Circuit, admitting that the circumstances were tragic, affirmed the decision 
of the district court, which had dismissed her case for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.61  The court reasoned that because the plaintiff sustained her 
injuries incident to service, Feres barred her claims.62
F.  Negligence Claims under Oklahoma Law 
In order for the plaintiff in Gonzalez to bring a negligence claim under 
the FTCA, she must demonstrate four elements under Oklahoma law: (1) 
that the military owed a duty to her; (2) that it breached this duty when it 
negligently hired Nazario; and (3) that the breach proximately caused (4) 
her injury.63  To prove the chain of causation, there cannot be any 
supervening acts, which are acts that are: (1) independent of the original 
negligence; (2) able to bring about the injury itself; and (3) not foreseeable 
based on the original negligence.64  Although a criminal act by a third party 
is generally considered a supervening event, there are two types of special 
relationships that create the duty to prevent the criminal actions of a third 
party and thus cause the original actor to be liable: (1) if the actor had a 
special duty to the person injured; or (2) where the actor’s affirmative 
 59. See Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 373 (indicating that her attacker helped her back to 
her barracks, noted the broken lock on her door, and returned later to rape her). 
 60. See id. (indicating that Gonzalez brought suit for monetary relief under the FTCA 
“for negligence, gross negligence, and violation of statutory duties,” along with a Title VII 
civil rights claim); see also United States v. Nazario, 56 M.J. 572, 573 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 
2001) (affirming Nazario’s sentence of “dishonorable discharge, confinement for twenty 
months, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and reduction” of grade level). 
 61. See Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 376 (stating that to allow the claim would question 
military discipline because the injury occurred while she was at an on-base party).  
 62. See id. at 374-75 (holding that the framework of the Ninth Circuit in Dreier 
demonstrates that Feres bars claims for injuries that occur on-base and while the plaintiff 
was on active duty and “subject to military discipline and control”). 
 63. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328A (1965) (stating the 
elements of a negligence claim).  The elements are: 
(a)[F]acts which give rise to a legal duty on the part of the defendant to conform to the 
standard of conduct established by law for the protection of the plaintiff; (b) failure of the 
defendant to conform to the standard of conduct; (c) that such failure is a legal cause of the 
harm suffered by the plaintiff; and (d) that the plaintiff has in fact suffered harm of a kind 
legally compensable by damages. 
Id. 
 64. See Thompson v. Presbyterian Hosp., Inc., 652 P.2d 260, 264 (Okla. 1982) (stating 
that a supervening cause breaks the causal chain and protects the “original actor from 
liability”). 
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action has exposed the injured person to a high degree of risk.65
Oklahoma law further recognizes that under the proximate cause 
analysis, the passage of time may qualify as a supervening event.66  The 
Fifth Circuit has stated, “[i]t is sufficient for proximate cause purposes if 
the [actor], as a reasonably prudent person, could or should have foreseen 
that someone” might be injured by the actor’s negligence, despite a lapse in 
time.67  In negligent hiring cases, as long as a court can determine that the 
proximate cause of the injury was the employer’s negligence in hiring, the 
passage of time between the injury and the hiring does not qualify as a 
supervening act.68
II.  ANALYSIS 
A.  The Feres Doctrine Should Not Have Barred the Plaintiff’s Claim 
Courts should read the FTCA broadly to allow a wide range of plaintiffs 
an opportunity for redress in federal district courts.69  As stated in White v. 
United States, courts must give the FTCA “liberal construction to ward off 
the obvious evil, which the Act was passed to prevent.”70  Courts do not 
 65. See Joyce v. M & M Gas Co., 672 P.2d 1172, 1173-74 (Okla. 1983) (detailing 
situations where an original actor should anticipate and protect against criminal conduct).  
See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 448 (1965) (stating that the original 
actor is generally not liable for the criminal acts of a third party, unless the actor knew or 
should have known that his negligence created a situation where a third party had the 
opportunity to commit such a crime). 
 66. See Leigh v. Wadsworth, 361 P.2d 849, 854 (Okla. 1961) (finding that whether a 
lapse of time qualifies as an intervening cause is a question of fact and, therefore, could 
remove liability from the original actor).  However, in this case, the passage of two-and-a-
half years between the construction of a roof and its collapse was not sufficient to break the 
causal chain as the roof should have remained safe for a longer period of time.  Id. at 854-
55.  See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433 cmt. c (1965) (explaining that 
although lapse in time is a factor, if the original negligence is still a substantial factor in 
bringing about the harm, then no lapse in time prevents the original actor from being liable). 
 67. See City of Brady v. Finklea, 400 F.2d 352, 357 (5th Cir. 1968) (stating that the 
original actor did not need to foresee that twenty-eight years after the light’s construction, 
wires would fall and kill a specific person).  It was enough that this type of accident was 
foreseeable to the original actor.  Id. 
 68. See, e.g., Mulloy v. United States, 937 F. Supp. 1001, 1012-13 (D. Mass. 1996) 
(explaining that the rape and murder of the plaintiff’s wife was proximately caused by the 
Army’s negligent hiring of the perpetrator because without the hiring, the injury never could 
have occurred).  The direct connection between the hiring and the injury satisfies proximate 
cause.  Id. 
 69. See Payton v. United States, 636 F.2d 132, 138 (5th Cir. 1981) (indicating that 
courts should not interpret the exceptions to the FTCA so as to virtually deny federal 
employees recovery, as this is against the statute’s purpose, which is to provide recovery in 
a wide range of situations). 
 70. 317 F.2d 13, 16 (4th Cir. 1963) (quoting Somerset Seafood Co. v. United States, 
193 F.2d 631, 635 (4th Cir. 1951)) (stating that one purpose of the FTCA is to prevent the 
unfairness of allowing the government to be immune from suits by federal employees in 
situations where private employees would have redress). 
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serve the purpose of the FTCA by narrowly construing its application.71  
Both the incredible expansion of the reach of the Feres Doctrine over 
particular claims72 and the majority interpretation of the assault and battery 
exception frustrate the intended purpose of the FTCA.73  Therefore, in 
order for the FTCA to serve Congress’s intended purpose, courts should 
limit the application of the Feres Doctrine to claims that directly question 
military order and discipline.74
As the Supreme Court initially created a distinction between injuries that 
occurred incident to service and injuries that did not, courts should 
continue to adhere to this distinction today.75  Furthermore, Feres should 
not bar tort claims, such as the one in Gonzalez, because the negligence 
alleged did not arise out of the sexual assault but instead arose prior to the 
injury itself.76  Instead, the application of the Feres Doctrine should extend 
only to injuries foreseeably arising out of service-related activities.77  The 
Feres Doctrine bars injuries caused by medical malpractice, malfunctioning 
weapons, and even negligently driven vehicles, as these are all accidental 
 71. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2005) (allowing for federal employees injured by other 
employees acting in the scope of their employment to seek relief against the federal 
government); see also Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 24-25 (explaining that a purpose of the FTCA 
was to provide relief for government employees who were injured in the course of their 
employment due to the negligence of another federal employee in situations where private 
employees would also have redress). 
 72. See Pringle, 208 F.3d at 1223-24 (citing Persons, 925 F.2d at 296 n.7) (explaining 
that courts have expanded Feres to bar almost every claim brought by an active duty service 
member); see also Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 379 (Lucero, J., concurring) (arguing that the 
scope of the Feres Doctrine has reached beyond its original limitations). 
 73. See Shearer, 473 U.S. at 54-55 (barring FTCA claims that allege that the 
government was negligent in its hiring procedures because, although negligence was the 
proximate cause of the injury, the claims stem from an assault or battery). 
 74. See, e.g., Johnson I, 481 U.S. at 694, 698-99 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
only prevailing rationale for barring claims for service-related injuries is that such claims 
would question military order and discipline); Johnson v. United States, 704 F.2d 1431, 
1436 (9th Cir. 1983) [hereinafter Johnson II] (stating that the strongest argument for the 
Feres Doctrine is the need to protect military order and discipline from judicial 
intervention). 
 75. Compare Brooks, 337 U.S. at 52-53 (allowing the plaintiff’s claim because the 
plaintiff’s injuries, which did not stem from direct military orders, did not occur incident to 
service), with Feres, 340 U.S. at 146 (barring the plaintiff’s claim and finding that when a 
plaintiff is on active duty and obeying military orders, then the injuries occur incident to 
service).  The plain language of Feres evidences its distinction from Brooks, as the Supreme 
Court in Feres found that there should be an “allowance of claims arising from noncombat 
activities in peace,” based on the language of the FTCA.  Id. at 138.  But see Gonzalez, 88 
Fed. Appx. at 375-76 (finding the plaintiff’s injuries incident to service where the plaintiff 
was injured while on-base and on duty, despite the fact that she was not obeying direct 
military orders or performing a military duty). 
 76. But see Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 375-76 (finding the negligence alleged in the 
complaint irrelevant to the entire Feres analysis by focusing on the circumstances 
surrounding the rape, not on the government’s negligence in hiring). 
 77. See Feres, 340 U.S. at 146 (barring claims for injuries that arose incident to service 
because they occurred while the plaintiff was under the compulsion of military orders). 
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injuries that are foreseeable consequences of military service.78  Although 
rape does occur within the military, it should not be an injury that an 
enlistee should consider foreseeable for purposes of the Feres analysis, as it 
does not arise as a consequence of one’s military service.79  Furthermore, 
rape should not be considered an accident or a consequence of carrying out 
one’s military commands or duties as it has no relation to other service-
related activities.80  Instead, rape is a severely punished crime within the 
military.81  A rape by a fellow service member should be unexpected based 
on the duty of care owed to fellow service members that entails a promise 
that a service member will not rape another, and instead, will do anything 
in his or her power to protect others.82
Furthermore, the factual pattern of Gonzalez is more akin to that of 
Brooks rather than that of Feres because the plaintiff in Gonzalez was not 
obeying military orders when the sexual assault occurred.83  In the present 
case, as in Brooks, there was no foreseeability that this rape could occur to 
 78. See Brooks, 337 U.S. at 52 (stating that examples of injuries that arise incident to 
service are those such as decisions made by officers in battle, a mistake by a military 
physician made during surgery, or a defective vehicle used in combat-related activities). 
 79. See Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 375 (failing to discuss the foreseeability of the 
occurrence of the plaintiff’s rape in the military); see also DEP’T OF DEF., TASK FORCE 
REPORT ON CARE FOR VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT 58 (2004) (explaining that in a study of 
more than 3600 female veterans taken to a Veterans Administration facility between July 
1994 and June 1995, twenty-three percent reported that they were sexually assaulted while 
in the military), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/ 
news/May2004/d20040513SATFReport.pdf (last visited June 1, 2005).  The Report further 
explains that due to differences in available studies and definitions, the comparison to 
civilian figures is unavailable.  Id.; see also Amy Herdy & Miles Moffeit, Betrayal in the 
Ranks, DENVER POST, 2004, at 4 (explaining that a survey in recent years by the Department 
of Veterans Affairs reported that nearly “[thirty] percent of women reported a rape or 
attempted rape” in the military, while a 2000 federal study lists the civilian comparison as 
“nearly [eighteen] percent”), available at http:// 
www.ici.kent.edu/newsbooks/tdp_betrayal.pdf (last visited June 1, 2005). 
 80. See Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 379 (Lucero, J., concurring) (stating that no young 
person, when enlisting for military service, could expect that injuries “incident to service” 
potentially would include sexual assault).  But see id. at 375 (finding that the sexual assault 
occurred incident to service, as it occurred on-base, while the plaintiff was on duty, and 
while she was receiving military benefits, despite there being no mention of military orders 
or commands). 
 81. See Nazario, 56 M.J. at 573 (approving the sentence of “dishonorable discharge, 
confinement for [twenty] months, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and reduction to E-1 
[grade level]” as a punishment for the crimes of rape, unlawful entry and fraudulent 
enlistment).  See generally 10 U.S.C.S. § 920 (2004) (indicating that the specified 
punishments in the Uniform Code of Military Justice for the crime of rape range from death 
to a mere reduction in grade level and demonstrating that rape is not tolerated within the 
military). 
 82. See 10 U.S.C. § 934 (2004) (requiring all military members to perform their actions 
under a standard of “good order and discipline”); United States v. Swift, 53 M.J. 439, 448 
(C.A.A.F. 2000) (stating specifically that rape is against military policy because it has a 
substantial impact on “good order” and “discipline”). 
 83. But see Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 376 (finding that Feres bars this sexual assault 
claim because the plaintiff’s activities at the time of injury, drinking and impaired sleeping, 
were recreational and occurred based on military orders and discipline). 
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a person enlisted in the military, as one is supposed to feel safe while on 
duty.84  In Feres, the injuries that occurred were a foreseeable result of 
being on active duty in the military.85  Gonzalez demonstrates the 
expansion of the Feres Doctrine to a point never intended by early case 
law, since courts have virtually destroyed the judicially-created distinction 
between Feres and Brooks.86
As the relevant focus in Feres cases is the moment of negligence and not 
the moment of the injury, the Tenth Circuit incorrectly analyzed 
Gonzalez.87  The Tenth Circuit ignored that the moment of negligence in 
the plaintiff’s case occurred at a different point in time than the plaintiff’s 
injury.88  The negligence itself (the enlistment of Nazario) and the injury 
(the rape) occurred at two distinct points in time.89  Therefore, the Tenth 
Circuit should have analyzed the plaintiff’s claim in Gonzalez by focusing 
on the time of the alleged negligence, as that is the relevant inquiry, and not 
on the point when the injury occurred.90
 84. See Feres, 340 U.S. at 146 (finding that there is a “vital distinction” between 
Brooks and Feres because the plaintiff in Brooks was “under compulsion of no orders or 
duty and on no military mission”).  Arguably, as the plaintiff was not on active duty or 
under orders, this demonstrated that the injury that occurred was not foreseeable in nature.  
Id.  But see Brooks, 337 U.S. at 52 (specifying that injuries that arise out of service are those 
that occur as a result of the poor judgment of a commander in battle, a defective Jeep or a 
surgeon’s slip).  A service member potentially could foresee these types of injuries.  Id. 
 85. See Feres, 340 U.S. at 136-37 (deciding three consolidated cases: one case where 
the decedent perished in a fire in the barracks when the military should have known the 
heating elements to be unsafe and two medical malpractice cases alleging the negligence of 
military doctors during various operations).  In the first case, the defendant was under the 
compulsion of direct military orders to remain quartered in his barracks when the fire 
occurred.  Id.  In the other two cases, it was foreseeable that injuries could arise in medical 
operations by physicians who lack the requisite training.  Id. 
 86. Compare id.  at 146 (finding that an injury arises incident to service when the 
plaintiff is on duty and obeying direct military orders), and Brooks, 337 U.S. at 52 (holding 
that the injuries the plaintiff received were not incident to service because they did not occur 
while he was under compulsion of military orders; they occurred while he was on furlough), 
with Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 375 (holding that the plaintiff’s rape was an injury incident 
to service simply because it occurred while she was on active duty and on-base). 
 87. See Monaco v. United States, 661 F.2d 129, 133 (9th Cir. 1981) (creating a 
distinction between the alleged negligence that occurred prior to the plaintiff’s injuries and 
the moment of the actual injury).  The court then based the Feres analysis on the moment of 
the negligence, rather then on the moment of the injury.  Id.; see also Kendrick v. United 
States, 877 F.2d 1201, 1203 (4th Cir. 1989) (finding that the correct focus of Feres is not 
when the injury occurs but rather on the circumstances surrounding the negligent act); 
Henning v. United States, 446 F.2d 774, 777 (3d Cir. 1971) (arguing that courts should base 
the Feres analysis on the negligence alleged rather than on the moment of injury because of 
the Supreme Court’s holding in United States v. Brown, which allowed a former service 
member to recover because the negligence occurred after his discharge). 
 88. See Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 374 (failing to acknowledge the plaintiff’s claim of 
negligence as the appropriate focus in Feres cases). 
 89. See id. at 372-73 (explaining that the rape took place in July 1999); Nazario, 56 
M.J. at 577 (stating that Nazario began the enlistment process in Fall 1998). 
 90. See Monaco, 661 F.2d at 133 (arguing that the appropriate analysis in a Feres case 
should be based on the negligence alleged rather than on the injury that occurred).  But see 
Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 375 (analyzing the plaintiff’s claim based on the injury she 
received rather than focusing on the negligence alleged in the claim). 
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In Gonzalez, the Tenth Circuit used the Ninth Circuit’s four factors as 
guides to determine whether Feres barred the plaintiff’s claim, thus 
demonstrating a respect for the Ninth Circuit’s legal analysis in this area of 
case law.91  In addressing the four factors, the Court failed to take into 
account the actual negligence alleged by the plaintiff regarding the hiring 
of Nazario.92  The negligence alleged did not stem from the actual assault 
and battery, but occurred prior to the plaintiff’s rape.93  The analysis of the 
Feres portion of the plaintiff’s case should have yielded a different 
outcome because the alleged negligence arose prior to the assault; 
therefore, the Tenth Circuit failed to analyze the claim properly.94  The 
following five sections will elaborate on each factor of the four-part test 
and then discuss the prevailing concern behind the Feres Doctrine.95
1.  The Location of the Negligent Act 
The Tenth Circuit erroneously interpreted the location of the injury to be 
the relevant inquiry in Gonzalez because the focus in Feres cases is on the 
negligence alleged, not the actual injury.96  Therefore, as the negligent 
conduct in Gonzalez was the failure of the military to perform an adequate 
background check on Nazario, the location of the actual negligence is 
unknown because it may not have occurred on-base.97  Nevertheless, the 
 91. See 88 Fed. Appx. at 374-75 (citing Dreier, 106 F.3d at 848) (stating that the Ninth 
Circuit’s four factors determine whether the plaintiff’s injury was incident to service 
through a balancing of the circumstances).  The court further found that the injury was 
incident to service, because it occurred pursuant to the plaintiff’s attendance at an on-base 
party and was a direct result of her military status.  Id. 
 92. See id. at 375 (determining that the Feres Doctrine barred the plaintiff’s claim based 
on the received injury and not the recruiter’s negligence).  The plaintiff alleged, among 
other things, that the military was negligent in its failure to perform an adequate background 
check on Nazario at the time of his hiring.  Id. at 373; see also Dreier, 106 F.3d at 848 
(stating the four factors that courts tend to focus on in a Feres case). 
 93. See Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 375 (explaining that the plaintiff alleged that the 
military negligently enlisted Nazario).  The court noted that the plaintiff’s rape occurred in 
July 1999, which was, at most, nine months after Nazario’s enlistment.  Id. at 372-73; see 
also Henning, 446 F.2d at 777 (stating that the correct focus in a Feres analysis is on the 
moment of negligence, not the moment of injury, because the negligence is the basis of the 
claim). 
 94. See Kendrick, 877 F.2d at 1203 (noting that the relevant focus in the Feres analysis 
is the moment of negligence, not the moment of injury).  But see Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 
375 (ignoring the relevant inquiry in the Feres analysis, the negligence alleged, and instead 
focusing erroneously on the injury that the plaintiff received). 
 95. See infra Parts II.A.1-II.B (analyzing the four-part test by focusing on the 
negligence alleged in the complaint, rather then on the plaintiff’s injury and discussing the 
reasoning behind the need to protect military order and discipline). 
 96. See Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 374-75 (failing to focus the guideposts from Dreier 
on the actual claim of the plaintiff and instead focusing the analysis on the moment of 
injury); see also Monaco, 661 F.3d at 133 (stating that courts should focus on the negligence 
alleged and not the moment of the injury). 
 97. See Nazario, 56 M.J. at 577 (failing to state where the enlistment of Nazario took 
place).  The court noted that it was Nazario who initially contacted the recruiter about his 
enlistment.  Id.  But see Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 374-75 (finding that the location of the 
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location alone is not dispositive and the court must consider it in 
conjunction with the other Feres factors.98  In some cases, courts have 
allowed recovery where the negligence occurred on a military base and, in 
other cases, denied recovery when the negligence occurred off-base.99  In 
either instance, however, this factor cannot weigh heavily in the overall 
analysis because of the unknown location of the negligent act and, 
therefore, the court must consider this factor relative to the other 
circumstances in this case.100
2.  The Status of the Plaintiff at the Time of the Negligent Hiring 
The negligence that the plaintiff in Gonzalez alleged may have occurred 
prior to her entry into the military.101  However, as the relevant focus of the 
Feres inquiry is the moment of the negligence, the unknown status of the 
plaintiff at the time of the military’s negligence cannot provide any 
guidance.102  If the plaintiff had not enlisted yet, none of her claims of 
negligence could involve military decisions.103
Even if the plaintiff was on active duty at the time of the government’s 
negligence, the status of the plaintiff is not highly relevant to the Feres 
analysis because it does not demonstrate any relationship between the 
rape was on-base, and therefore, this was the relevant inquiry).  The Tenth Circuit failed to 
state whether the enlistment of Nazario took place on a military site.  Id. 
 98. See Johnson II, 704 F.2d at 1437 (stating that even when an injury occurs on-base, 
the court must analyze the actions that the active duty service member was performing at the 
time of the injury).  The location of the incident, alone, does not decide the case.  Id.; see 
also Parker v. United States, 611 F.2d 1007, 1014 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating that although 
Brooks permits recovery if the injury occurred off-base, the converse is not always true).  If 
the injury to the plaintiff occurred on-base, the proper focus is to examine the nature of the 
service member’s function in performing the activity at issue—whether the activity was an 
order or a duty.  Id. 
 99. See Whitley v. United States, 170 F.3d 1061, 1072 n.24 (11th Cir. 1999) 
(explaining that various courts have allowed recovery regardless of where the location of the 
negligent act occurred because they have considered the location prong in combination with 
the service member’s activity); see, e.g., Elliot ex. rel. Elliot v. United States, 877 F. Supp. 
1569, 1576 (M.D. Ga. 1992) (permitting recovery in a case where on-base carbon monoxide 
poisoning occurred). 
 100. See Bon v. United States, 802 F.2d 1092, 1095 n.3 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding that 
although the location of the act, if known, is important, it does not control the Feres analysis 
and, even if the location is definitely a military site, this does not automatically bar recovery 
under Feres); see also Johnson II, 704 F.2d at 1437 (stating that the location of the 
negligence is not dispositive in the Feres analysis because courts must balance all relevant 
factors). 
 101. See Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 375 (stating that at the time of the injury, the 
plaintiff was an active duty service member, but failing to mention the status of the plaintiff 
at the time of the military’s negligence in enlisting Nazario). 
 102. See Kendrick, 877 F.2d at 1203 (indicating that the proper focus should be on the 
time of the negligence, not the time of the injury, assuming that the negligence and the 
injury were not simultaneous).  But see Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 375 (failing to question 
what the military status of the plaintiff was at the time of Nazario’s enlistment). 
 103. See Monaco, 661 F.2d at 132 (noting that if plaintiffs are not on active duty or 
enlisted in the military at the time of the negligence, then Feres cannot bar the claims 
because there is no need to protect military order and discipline). 
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negligence and the plaintiff’s military service.104  Furthermore, the Tenth 
Circuit should not have interpreted the plaintiff’s claim to mean that but for 
her status as a military member, Nazario would never have raped her, 
because this is not the relevant inquiry.105  Therefore, as the status of the 
plaintiff at the time of the negligence is unknown and unpersuasive, it 
cannot weigh heavily towards barring the plaintiff’s claim.106
3.  The Benefits the Plaintiff Received Due to Her Military Status 
The Tenth Circuit improperly analyzed the plaintiff’s military service in 
the overall Feres analysis.107  The negligent act of hiring Nazario occurred 
prior to the moment the plaintiff in Gonzalez sustained her injury.108  
Therefore, any benefits received by the plaintiff during her military service 
are irrelevant to the overall Feres analysis.109  There is no relation between 
the time of the negligent hiring of Nazario, and the minimal benefits 
received by the plaintiff at the time of her injury.110
The Tenth Circuit found that the benefit the plaintiff received at the time 
of her injury was her ability to attend an on-base military party.111  Courts 
have found that injuries that occur during recreational activities are incident 
to service because they relate to military order and discipline.112  However, 
the plaintiff’s ability to attend an on-base party is not a direct consequence 
of her military status, because other civilians could attend this party, and 
therefore, the factor cannot weigh heavily in the overall Feres analysis.113  
 104. See Johnson II, 704 F.2d at 1438 (stating that the plaintiff’s military status was only 
relevant in the Feres analysis insofar as the status demonstrated any relationship between 
the government’s negligent act or omission and the plaintiff’s military service). 
 105. See Parker, 611 F.2d at 1011 (indicating that courts should not interpret “incident to 
service” to mean “but for the individual’s military service, the injury would not have 
occurred,” because courts must do an independent analysis of all the factors to determine 
whether Feres bars the claim). 
 106. See Johnson II, 704 F.2d at 1438 (explaining that this factor is only relevant insofar 
as it demonstrates a relation between the negligence and the plaintiff’s military status). 
 107. See Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 376 (using the fact that the plaintiff was at an on-
base party to demonstrate that the benefits she received flowed directly from her military 
status and, therefore, barred the claim). 
 108. See id. at 372-73 (indicating that the rape occurred in July 1999); Nazario, 56 M.J. 
at 577 (stating that Nazario’s enlistment process began several months prior to the rape, in 
Fall 1998). 
 109. See Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 376 (implying that the benefit the plaintiff received 
was the ability to attend an on-base party with other civilians). 
 110. See id. at 375-76 (failing to explain the relevance between the plaintiff’s benefit, the 
ability to attend the party, and the negligence on the part of the military in enlisting 
Nazario). 
 111. See id. at 376 (arguing that the ability to attend an on-base party was a direct 
consequence of the plaintiff’s military service). 
 112. See Costo, 248 F.3d at 868-69 (indicating that most recreational activities that are 
military-sponsored fall under the Feres bar because these activities reinforce good morale, 
order and discipline within the military and, thus, serve a military purpose). 
 113. See Johnson II, 704 F.2d at 1438-39 (explaining that if the benefit received by the 
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Furthermore, because there is no articulable tie between the military’s 
negligent hiring and the benefits received by the plaintiff as a result of 
being in the military, the focus on the status of the plaintiff at the time of 
the negligent act is irrelevant to the overall Feres analysis.114
4.  The Nature of the Plaintiff’s Activities at the Time of the Negligent Act 
Although the nature of the plaintiff’s activities at the time of the 
negligent act weighs heavily in the overall analysis,115 this final factor is 
unknown and, therefore, not determinative of whether Feres bars the 
plaintiff’s claim.116  The plaintiff’s activities at the time of injury indicate 
that she was not subject directly to military discipline, nor was she acting 
under orders or performing any duty.117  At the time of the actual assault, 
which should not be relevant to the court’s analysis, the plaintiff’s activity 
was not service-related because another service member raped her while 
she was “sleeping in an impaired state.”118  The sexual activity at the 
moment of injury “served no military purpose,” nor was it related to any 
military purpose.119
Furthermore, similar to the plaintiff in Brooks, the court should not have 
plaintiff is indistinguishable from other benefits that a civilian could receive, then the 
benefit is not a direct consequence of being in the military).  The Court found that that the 
plaintiff’s part-time, after-hours employment in a military club was not distinguishable from 
any other part-time employment unrelated to military duties.  Id. at 1439. 
 114. See Holman v. United States, No. 91-15012, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 13588, at *8, 
11 (9th Cir. June 5, 1992) (mem.) (stating that the benefits the plaintiff received are only 
relevant to explain the plaintiff’s presence at the military site and do not outweigh any other 
factor, such as participating in conduct regulated by the military, in the overall analysis).  
But see Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 374-75 (focusing erroneously on the moment of injury 
and stating that the benefit received by the plaintiff was the ability to attend an on-base party 
that civilians also attended). 
 115. See Johnson II, 704 F.2d at 1439 (stating that the nature of the plaintiff’s activities 
at the time of the negligent act is the most relevant factor in the overall Feres analysis to 
determine whether this claim would question military orders and discipline). 
 116. See Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 372-73 (focusing incorrectly on the moment of the 
plaintiff’s injury rather than the moment of negligence and, therefore, failing to explain the 
activities of the plaintiff at the time of Nazario’s enlistment). 
 117. Cf. Miller v. United States, 643 F.2d 481, 486 (8th Cir. 1980) (arguing that although 
a court could consider virtually every part of a service member’s life incident to service, 
there are situations where the plaintiff’s injury does not relate to his military duties).  
Compare Day v. Massachusetts Air Nat’l Guard, 167 F.3d 678, 683 (1st Cir. 1999) (finding 
that this factor weighed in the plaintiff’s favor under Feres, as he was asleep at the time of 
his sexual assault), with Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 376 (explaining that the plaintiff was 
under military orders and discipline, despite being asleep at the time of her injury). 
 118. See Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 375-76 (arguing that although the plaintiff was not 
awake at the time of her injury, courts have found that the Feres Doctrine bars recreational 
activities, to which sleep can be analogized, despite the plaintiff being under no actual 
military control). 
 119. See Stubbs v. United States, 744 F.2d 58, 60 (8th Cir. 1984) (indicating that sexual 
harassment does not serve a specific military purpose).  The court in Stubbs balanced this 
factor against two others, the duty status of the plaintiff at the moment of injury (obeying 
military orders to clean the latrines) and the location of the injury (on-base), and ultimately 
barred the plaintiff’s claim under the Feres Doctrine.  Id. 
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found that the plaintiff in Gonzalez was, at the time of her rape, obeying 
direct military orders or performing any activity related to her military 
career.120  Instead, she was sleeping, “in an impaired state,” much the same 
as any person would after a party where he or she possibly had too much to 
drink.121  Sleep, regardless of whether someone is in an impaired state, is 
not an activity that someone performs under the compulsion of military 
orders.122  Therefore, the sleeping plaintiff in Gonzalez closely resembles 
the furloughed plaintiff in Brooks, who also was not subject to military 
orders at the time of his injury.123
Although the plaintiff’s injuries occurred on-base while the plaintiff was 
on active duty and subject to military discipline, the negligent act did not 
occur at this same moment and, therefore, the court’s analysis is flawed 
because it should have focused on the moment of negligence, not the 
moment of injury.124  Balancing the sexual assault, which has no military 
purpose, against the plaintiff’s activities, status, and location at the time of 
the negligent act, which were all unknown, demonstrates that Feres should 
not have barred the plaintiff’s claim.125  Furthermore, allowing the 
plaintiff’s claim to proceed on the merits would only serve to support the 
disciplinary structure within the military, which is the very rationale behind 
the Feres Doctrine, as it likely would make the military more trustworthy 
 120. Compare Brooks, 337 U.S. at 52 (finding that the injury received by the plaintiff 
had nothing to do with his military career or military orders because he was on furlough 
and, therefore, was not incident to service), with Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 375 
(demonstrating that the plaintiff received her injury while she was on-base, however, she 
was drunk and sleeping at the time of her rape). 
 121. See Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 376 (finding that although the plaintiff was not 
furthering a military objective when she slept, she still was subjected to military discipline 
at that time). 
 122. See Day, 167 F.3d at 683 (barring the plaintiff’s assault claim under Feres, 
however, specifically stating that the fact that the plaintiff was asleep, and therefore, not on 
duty, at the time of injury weighed in his favor).  But see Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 375-76 
(disregarding the fact that the plaintiff actually was asleep on-base in her own barracks 
when the injury occurred, and instead finding that she was still subject to military orders and 
discipline when the rape occurred). 
 123. See Feres, 340 U.S. at 146 (finding that Feres differed from Brooks, as the plaintiff 
in the latter was on furlough at the time of his injury and was not under military orders at the 
time).  But see Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 376 (arguing that the military subjected the 
plaintiff to orders while she was both asleep and intoxicated). 
 124. Compare Monaco, 661 F.2d at 133 (indicating that as long as the negligence occurs 
at a time that the plaintiff is not in the military service, even if the injury does, the Feres 
Doctrine does not bar the plaintiff’s claim), with Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 375 (barring 
the plaintiff’s claim under Feres because it analyzed the claim based on the moment of 
injury, which occurred during the plaintiff’s service, not on the negligence, which possibly 
occurred prior to her time in the service). 
 125. Compare Dreier, 106 F.3d at 852-53 (holding that the Feres Doctrine did not bar 
the plaintiff’s claim because, at the time of his death, the plaintiff was (1) indistinguishable 
from a civilian; (2) on-base; (3) not receiving any benefits that were military related; and (4) 
taking part in activities that were not military related), with Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 375 
(finding that the Feres Doctrine barred the plaintiff’s claim because, at the time of injury, 
the plaintiff was: (1) an active duty military member; (2) on-base; (3) receiving military 
benefits; and (4) taking part in military-related activities). 
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in the eyes of a service member because he or she would know that there is 
an outside check on the actions of those in the service.126
B.  The Protection of Military Order and Discipline 
The prevailing judicial concern in allowing the Feres Doctrine to bar 
cases is the protection of military order and discipline.127  Under the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice, any service member “who believes 
himself wronged” may bring to the attention of a commanding officer any 
injury that may have occurred.128  If the commanding officer refuses to 
offer any redress, then the service member can complain to any superior 
officer.129  However, this does not necessarily solve the problem in cases 
that allege serious accusations, such as sexual assault or sexual 
harassment.130  For example, the superior could potentially be the aggressor 
in the situation, thereby leaving the plaintiff without anyone independent of 
the situation to hear her claim.131  In addition, the perpetrator could deny 
the accusations, or attempt to cover them up, rendering it a “he-said, she-
said” argument, which further could destroy any order within the 
military.132
If civilian courts were to address claims that alleged injuries based on 
sexual assault, this would only help to promote military order, rather than 
 126. See Dreier, 106 F.3d at 849 (stating that the most relevant question is whether 
adjudication of this type of claim would have negative effects on the disciplinary system 
within the military).  See generally Jonathan Turley, Pax Militaris: The Feres Doctrine and 
the Retention of Sovereign Immunity in the Military System of Governance, 71 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 1, 78 n.527 (2003) (arguing that the protection of military order and discipline can 
only occur when civilian courts review military policies since rape, itself, is against 
discipline and order within the military). 
 127. See Johnson I, 481 U.S. at 691-92 (stating that if the litigation of certain claims 
would disturb the order and disciplinary structure within the military, courts should not hear 
the specific claim under the Feres Doctrine). 
 128. See 10 U.S.C. § 938 art. 138 (2004) (protecting service members with the right of 
review within the military in order to avoid any arbitrary or harmful decisions). 
 129. See id. (indicating that once the service members complain to any superior officer, 
it is the superior officer’s duty to forward the complaint to the officer in charge of court-
martials, who, in turn, will evaluate the claim and take the proper measures). 
 130. See, e.g., Shiver v. United States, 34 F. Supp. 2d 321, 322 (D. Md. 1999) (finding 
that the plaintiff’s drill sergeant was the one who allegedly raped her); Corey v. United 
States, No. 96-6409, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 22258, at *3-5 (10th Cir. Aug. 20, 1997) 
(stating that after the plaintiff’s Colonel repeatedly sexually harassed her, she filed a 
complaint within the military).  However, this incident was covered up, threats were made 
to potential witnesses, and the Air Force did not take disciplinary action against the harasser.  
Id.; Stubbs, 744 F.2d at 59 (indicating that after the sergeant sexually harassed the plaintiff, 
the plaintiff told her sister that if she complained to her superior officer as directed by the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice, “the Army would turn on her as a troublemaker”). 
 131. See, e.g., Shiver, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 322 (explaining that the perpetrator was an 
officer with a position of authority); Stubbs, 744 F.2d at 59 (demonstrating that the 
aggressor was the plaintiff’s superior officer). 
 132. See, e.g., Corey, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 22258, at *3-5 (indicating that other 
officers attempted to cover up the situation, leaving the plaintiff to defend herself, and 
leaving her claim without any other support). 
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interfere with it.133  A situation that leaves a plaintiff in the military without 
a remedy or the ability to bring suit against her aggressor who is also in the 
service will serve to erode military order.134  It is unlikely that an 
individual would want to work to benefit a system that refuses to help her 
or turns a blind eye to her situation.135  The harm that could result from 
judicial interference is far less costly than the harm and morale drain that 
could result from the failure to address the injury at all.136  The ability of 
the judicial branch to question the military in these situations allows 
military members, particularly women, to feel secure in their positions by 
knowing that if a rape occurred, they could have a remedy in civilian 
courts.137  The advancement of military order and discipline is enhanced by 
allowing potential plaintiffs the knowledge that independent judicial 
systems will properly address and potentially remedy their injuries.138  The 
military cannot afford to allow a situation to occur where there is so much 
distrust and secrecy as to cause a commanding officer to lack respect or 
 133. See Michael I. Spak & Jonathan P. Tomes, Sexual Harassment in the Military: Time 
for a Change of Forum?, 47 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 335, 359-60 (1999) (arguing that the internal 
investigations of the instances of sexual harassment and assault at both Tailhook and 
Aberdeen Proving Ground interfered so much with military order and discipline that 
litigating sexual assault and harassment cases only could help the situation within the 
military, not harm it).  But see Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1983) 
(explaining that the “special status” of the military requires a justice system specifically for 
the military, separate from the civilian court system). 
 134. See Turley, supra note 126, at 78 n.527 (explaining that the protection of discipline 
does not take place where a court does not review military policies because allowing sexual 
assault to occur without any questioning is actually contrary to discipline and order).  But 
see Chappell, 462 U.S. at 304 (finding that the special relationship between a soldier and his 
superiors would not allow a lower ranked soldier to question or to hold his superior liable, 
because this questioning potentially would destroy military order and discipline). 
 135. See Stubbs, 744 F.2d at 60-61 (explaining that the reason the victim committed 
suicide was because she felt as if the military would do nothing to support her claim of 
sexual harassment against her commanding officer, but rejecting the plaintiff’s claim that 
the military “created the atmosphere which ultimately led to [the plaintiff’s] suicide”). 
 136. See Smith v. United States, 196 F.3d 774, 778 (7th Cir. 1999) (indicating that the 
tolerance of rape and sexual harassment within the military “results in a warping of military 
discipline, a lack of military readiness, and a weakening of national security”).  But see 
Chappell, 462 U.S. at 303-04 (emphasizing that judicial interference in the military would 
undermine the hierarchy that the military has established, thus destroying any discipline that 
the military has created). 
 137. But see Mazur, supra note 5, at 718 n.103 (indicating that the purpose of barring 
sexual harassment and assault claims under Feres is because litigation is not effective 
discipline for those within the military).  However, the military justice system apparently 
does not provide effective discipline either, based on the high number of rapes and potential 
rapes that women face.  Herdy & Moffeit, supra note 79, at 4. 
 138. See Spak & Tomes, supra note 133, at 363 n.153 (indicating that although Feres 
bars judicial intrusion in claims against the military in an attempt to promote military 
discipline, this premise does not likely hold true in claims that allege sexual assault).  
Questioning the decisions of those who commit sexual assault cannot undermine control, as 
the perpetrators likely would not have any control or authority left to question.  Id.  But see 
Chappell, 462 U.S. at 303-04 (indicating that the military is not democratic and, therefore, 
does not allow for civilian interference with the disciplinary structure of the military). 
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credibility.139  Although the Supreme Court designed Feres to protect the 
military from judicial intervention,140 the Court also judicially created the 
Doctrine to prevent the chaos that might ensue from a situation where 
service members question the orders and commands of superior officers.141  
The refusal of courts to hear such claims only fosters the very situations 
that the Supreme Court intended Feres to prevent, because without judicial 
questioning, obedience and loyalty within the military could result in 
distrust and insubordination.142
C.  The Discretionary Function Exception Should not Bar 
the Plaintiff’s Claim Because the Negligence was not 
at the Planning Level 
The discretionary function exception should not have barred the 
plaintiff’s claim in Gonzalez, because the decision made by the recruiter 
was not one of a discretionary nature.143  Decisions at the planning level 
focus on the type of person to admit into the military, while decisions at the 
operational level focus on the decision to admit a specific person into the 
military.144  The actual enlistment of a person into the military occurs at the 
operational level; therefore, the discretionary function exception does not 
apply.145  Therefore, since a military regulation bound the recruiter in 
Gonzalez to perform a background check accurately and the recruiter failed 
in this duty, the decision to enlist Nazario occurred at the operational 
 139. See, e.g., Stubbs, 744 F.2d at 60-61 (demonstrating that where a commanding 
officer sexually harassed a subordinate, the victim committed suicide because she felt that 
other officers would not believe that he assaulted her). 
 140. See Johnson I, 481 U.S. at 690-91 (finding that the protection against judicial 
intervention into military decisions was a reason behind the Feres Doctrine).  Courts attempt 
to protect these decisions, since they closely relate to the ability to complete military 
missions.  Id.
 141. See Feres, 340 U.S. at 143-44 (protecting the unique relationship between the 
soldier and the soldier’s superiors). 
 142. See Saum v. Widnall, 912 F. Supp. 1384, 1396 (D. Colo. 1996) (stating that courts 
can grant review when the plaintiff’s claim is relatively serious and the potential injury to 
the plaintiff greatly outweighs any interference that judicial questioning might have with 
military decisions).  But see Johnson I, 481 U.S. at 691 (arguing that obedience and loyalty 
within the military are promoted by not allowing courts to question military decisions). 
 143. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2005) (indicating that the government cannot be liable for 
claims based on the discretion of federal employees at the planning level); see also Bryson, 
463 F. Supp. at 911-12 (clarifying how acts, such as the ones in Gonzalez, occurred not at 
the planning level but at the operational level, and thus the discretionary function 
presumptively does not apply). 
 144. See Bryson, 463 F. Supp. at 911-12 (explaining that the standards to judge whether 
an applicant is qualified for the military are developed at a planning level, thus exempting 
the government from liability as to the content of those standards).  However, the actual 
application of the standards takes place at the operational level, permitting courts to hold the 
government liable.  Id. 
 145. See id. at 912 (finding that the operational level consists of any action on the part of 
a federal employee that takes and applies the plans and judgments to individual cases). 
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level.146  The recruiter’s actions were not at the planning level because he 
was not making any overall policy judgments, so the discretionary function 
exception does not apply.147
As Congress’s intended purpose of this exception was to prevent judicial 
interference in military decision-making, this exception is not applicable in 
the case at hand because the decision by the recruiter was not discretionary; 
rather, it was a failure to follow prescribed regulations.148  Congress 
effectively would be endorsing a policy of admitting convicted felons into 
the military if it did not allow judicial questioning of decisions made by 
recruiters while violating prescribed regulations.149  The decision to admit 
one person into the military who happens to be a prior convicted felon is 
not the type of decision Congress intended to shield from judicial scrutiny 
under the discretionary function exception.150  Judicial interference in a 
situation similar to Gonzalez would protect the safety and security of the 
military because these factors cannot exist if enlistees are prior convicted 
felons.151  More importantly, the military cannot function properly if it 
exists conditioned upon a system of mistrust and fear. 
D.  The Tenth Circuit Should Adopt the Ninth Circuit’s 
Position on Negligent Hiring Because Doing So Would 
Better Serve the Purpose Behind the FTCA 
The appropriate analysis of negligent hiring claims is the framework 
used by the Ninth Circuit in Senger as opposed to that of the Shearer 
 146. See Nazario, 56 M.J. at 577 (demonstrating that the recruiter failed to determine 
what was enclosed within Nazario’s sealed records); see also 32 C.F.R. § 96.1 (2005) 
(requiring that the military perform a background check on all military applicants, and 
noting that a felony charge bars enlistment). 
 147. See Bryson, 463 F. Supp. at 911-12 (stating that the enlistment of a specific 
individual into the military is at the operational level because it entails putting policy into 
effect and does not require the use of judgment on the part of the recruiter; instead, the 
planning level requires the use of judgment); see also Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536 (finding 
that the relevant inquiry that guides the analysis is the nature of the employee’s conduct, not 
the status of the employee).  The Court further stated that if there were a statute, regulation 
or policy that mandated the actions of the employee, it would not be discretionary because 
there would not be the element of choice involved.  Id. 
 148. See Nazario, 56 M.J. at 577 (stating that the recruiter attempted to determine the 
truthfulness of Nazario’s statements as regulations bound him to do so); see also Varig 
Airlines, 467 U.S. at 814 (indicating that the purpose of the exception is to prevent judicial 
questioning in certain types of decisions that Congress intended to shield from liability). 
 149. See Bryson, 463 F. Supp. at 911-12 (subjecting the government to liability where a 
recruiter does not follow the prescribed instructions regarding the enlistment of a specific 
person into the military, since planning level decisions are not those that Congress intended 
to shield from liability). 
 150. See United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 163 (1963) (finding that the purpose of 
the discretionary function exception is to protect against suits that would prevent efficiency 
in governmental operations). 
 151. But see id. (stating that governmental agencies, such as the military, must be able to 
run efficiently without judicial interference and questioning). 
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plurality.152  The framework the Tenth Circuit used, that of the Shearer 
plurality, is erroneous because it does not follow the procedure dictated by 
the FTCA.153  Since the meaning behind the FTCA is to allow a broad class 
of persons the ability to seek redress against the federal government for 
negligence, courts should not grant broad immunity.154  Instead, the 
Supreme Court should grant certiorari to a similar case in order to resolve 
the discrepancies among circuits, and should adopt the Ninth Circuit’s 
position on negligent hiring because doing so would better serve the 
purpose behind the FTCA.155
While Shearer and Gonzalez have some similarities, the circumstances 
surrounding the injury in Shearer are quite different from those of 
Gonzalez.156  On the other hand, the facts of Senger and Gonzalez are quite 
similar, as both cases demonstrate negligence on the part of the government 
regarding its hiring and retention procedures.157  The plaintiff’s complaint 
in Gonzalez should have focused on the failure of the military to complete 
its duty of ensuring that prior convicted felons do not enlist in the military, 
and this should have been the specific focus of the Tenth Circuit’s 
analysis.158  The facts surrounding Gonzalez demonstrate that it is truly a 
case of negligence arising prior to military service, similar to Senger, in 
 152. Compare Senger, 103 F.3d at 1442 (arguing that the intentional tort exception does 
not bar negligent hiring claims when the claims themselves do not arise directly from the 
assault and battery, and instead arise out of the government’s negligence in hiring), with 
Shearer, 473 U.S. at 54 (deciding that the intentional tort exception bars any claim that 
would not exist without the prior occurrence of an assault and battery and, therefore, barring 
negligent hiring claims). 
 153. See Shearer, 473 U.S. at 54 (holding, in a plurality opinion, that the intentional tort 
exception of the FTCA bars claims alleging that the government was negligent in failing to 
prevent the assault or battery of an active duty service member); Franklin, 992 F.2d at 1498 
(finding that the Tenth Circuit adopted the Shearer plurality opinion and, therefore, the 
intentional tort exception bars negligence claims because the claims stemmed from an 
assault or battery). 
 154. See Senger, 103 F.3d at 1441 (explaining that the purpose of the FTCA is to provide 
broad redress for plaintiffs). 
 155. See id. at 1441-42 (holding that the intentional tort exception should not bar 
negligent hiring claims because one purpose of the FTCA is to provide an avenue of redress 
for federal employees in situations where private employees have the ability to gain relief). 
 156. Compare Shearer, 473 U.S. at 52 (addressing a complaint that alleged that the 
military was negligent in its supervision of the perpetrator because he committed his assault 
subsequent to his enlistment), with Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 373 (explaining that Nazario 
had committed his crime prior to his enlistment into the military, thereby fraudulently 
enlisting). 
 157. Compare Senger, 103 F.3d at 1444 (explaining that the post office may have failed 
in its duty to third parties because the plaintiff’s assault should been foreseeable to the 
perpetrator’s employer as it knew of his long history of violence and instability), with 
Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 373 (indicating that the plaintiff did not focus her complaint 
directly on the negligence in the hiring of Nazario but, instead, had numerous negligence 
claims against the military). 
 158. But see Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 373 (explaining that the plaintiff’s claim alleged 
various FTCA arguments, without specifically focusing on one major claim, and then 
barring the claim under Feres without addressing any of the plaintiff’s arguments). 
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which the post office had knowledge of the prior instabilities in the 
perpetrator’s life, rather than just a case of a mere failure to supervise.159
Furthermore, the failure to supervise in Shearer occurred at the same 
moment as the injury, while the negligence in Gonzalez occurred prior to 
the injury, at the time of Nazario’s enlistment.160  Unlike Shearer, where 
the military did not have the ability to know of the perpetrator’s dangerous 
tendencies upon his enlistment, in Senger, the postal service knew of the 
perpetrator’s violent history.161  The military, in Gonzalez, should have 
known of Nazario’s prior assault conviction due to its enlistment 
regulations and, therefore, demonstrated negligence in its failure to follow 
its own procedures.162  The military could have prevented Nazario’s actions 
by rejecting his application prior to his enlistment, just as the post office 
could have prevented Senger’s assault had it taken the recommended action 
to remove the perpetrator from his job.163
Although a majority of circuits, including the Tenth Circuit, have 
adopted the concept that the assault and battery exception bars claims 
focusing on negligence in hiring, courts should not adopt the majority 
viewpoint in cases like Gonzalez.164  The Supreme Court still has not 
 159. See Nazario, 56 M.J. at 577 (demonstrating that Nazario fraudulently enlisted into 
the military, thereby showing that the negligence on the part of the military occurred prior to 
Nazario’s actual enlistment). 
 160. Compare Shearer, 473 U.S. at 54 (stating that the plaintiff alleged that the military 
failed to supervise the perpetrator, by enabling him to commit such a violent crime), with 
Senger, 103 F.3d at 1440 (explaining that the post office had knowledge of the perpetrator’s 
previous criminal acts, dangerous tendencies, and violent past, and even proposed that it 
remove him from his job many years prior to the actual assault), and Nazario, 56 M.J. at 
577 (demonstrating that the military failed in its duty to protect other service members by 
incorrectly following the military regulations regarding criminal background checks). 
 161. Compare Shearer, 473 U.S. at 54 (stating that the prior manslaughter conviction 
occurred at another Army base, and failing to mention whether the perpetrator had 
committed any violent felonies prior to his enlistment), with Senger, 103 F.3d at 1442 
(explaining that the perpetrator’s employer had knowledge of the his criminal history and 
stated that one of his criminal acts took place while he was working with the post office). 
 162. See 10 U.S.C. § 504 (1968) (forbidding any person who has a felony on his record 
to enlist in the military); Nazario, 56 M.J. at 577 (stating that the recruiter had the ability to 
run an accurate background check on Nazario, rather than merely make one phone call 
without any follow-up). 
 163. See Nazario, 56 M.J. at 577 (stating that the recruiter failed to complete the 
background check on Nazario and uncover the felony assault and, therefore, failed to 
determine the accuracy of Nazario’s statements regarding his criminal history); see also 
Senger, 103 F.3d at 1444 (stating that the court should hear the plaintiff’s claim on its merits 
because summary judgment was inappropriate where the injury to the plaintiff may have 
been foreseeable based on the knowledge the post office had at the time). 
 164. Compare Thigpen v. United States, 800 F.2d 393, 394 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding that 
§ 2680(h) bars all claims that rely on an existing assault or battery), and Hoot v. United 
States, 790 F.2d 836, 839 (10th Cir. 1986) (holding that the intentional tort exception barred 
the plaintiff’s claims for negligence because the claims arose from an assault or battery), 
with Senger, 103 F.3d at 1440-41 (stating that there is federal subject matter jurisdiction 
when a claim arises from negligence in the hiring or supervision of employees because the 
intentional tort exception does not bar such claims since the negligence, as opposed to the 
injuries, does not arise directly out of the assault or battery). 
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directly refuted the position of the Ninth Circuit, so it still stands as valid 
law, and the Tenth Circuit should adopt the minority viewpoint as a way to 
analyze negligent hiring claims.165  The viewpoint of the Ninth Circuit 
regarding negligent hiring better satisfies the legislative purpose behind the 
FTCA.166  In Gonzalez, the lack of an adequate background check was a 
negligent omission on the part of the military that the court should not have 
ignored.167  Although the military does have in place regulations to 
determine which candidates for enlistment have the proclivity to commit 
violent crimes,168 this system has not always proven reliable.169
E.  The Military Has an Affirmative Duty to Protect Service Members from 
Potentially Dangerous Individuals 
The military, just like any other employer, owes a duty to its employees 
to hire only those persons who will not cause injury to other employees.170  
Military regulations ensure that no foreseeably dangerous individuals have 
 165. See Senger, 103 F.3d at 1441 (providing a framework used for analyzing negligent 
hiring claims that is more consistent with the purpose of the FTCA in that it allows courts to 
hear a broad range of negligence claims against the federal government); see also Jack W. 
Massey, A Proposal to Narrow the Assault and Battery Exception to the Federal Tort 
Claims Act, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1621, 1622 (2004) (stating that the minority viewpoint is 
actually the better viewpoint to handle negligent hiring claims because it furthers the 
purpose of the FTCA). 
 166. See Senger, 103 F.3d at 1441 (stating that the purpose of the FTCA is to provide 
plaintiffs broad redress, if private citizens are also able to bring claims in similar situations). 
 167. See, e.g., Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 374 (leaving the victim without a remedy by 
dismissing her claim in federal court under the Feres Doctrine). 
 168. See 10 U.S.C. § 504 (indicating that among those persons not qualified to serve in 
the armed forces are those with prior felony convictions, as these persons have the 
inclination to commit criminal acts); 32 C.F.R. § 96.1 (2005) (authorizing the military to 
acquire the criminal histories of those applying to enlist to determine whether they have 
committed felonies in the past); see also UNITED STATES AIR FORCE, RECRUITING 
PROCEDURES FOR THE AIR FORCE, AETC INSTRUCTION 36-2002 77-82 (Apr. 18, 2000) 
(enumerating the offenses, such as assault, that may bar enlistment into the military, based 
on the reasoning that those who have previously committed criminal acts have the ability to 
do so again in the future), available at 
http://www.aetc.randolph.af.mil/im/pub/afpdl/publications/aetcpubs/aetcins/aetci36-
2002.pdf (last visited June 1, 2005). 
 169. See, e.g., Nazario, 56 M.J. at 577 (demonstrating that the recruiter failed to 
determine the accuracy of Nazario’s statements and uncover the felony assault on his 
record).  As the recruiter enlisted Nazario into the military, he breached his duty to protect 
the other enlisted members from foreseeably dangerous individuals.  Id.; see also Richard A. 
Oppel, Jr. & Ariel Hart, Contractor Indicted in Afghan Detainee’s Beating, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 18, 2004, at A1 (explaining that a court recently indicted a civilian contractor, who 
police had arrested fourteen years prior on felony assault charges, for “kicking and beating” 
a detainee in Iraq).  Despite his previous assault charges, the military had placed him at Fort 
Bragg, North Carolina, as a member of the Special Forces in the Army.  Id. 
 170. See Sheridan, 487 U.S. at 403 (holding that the military has a duty to prevent a 
foreseeably dangerous individual from doing anything unattended); King v. United States, 
756 F. Supp. 1357, 1360 (E.D. Cal. 1990) (indicating that in negligence claims, the first 
thing that a plaintiff must demonstrate is a pre-existing duty to protect a group of people 
from harm).  See generally RESTATEMENT SECOND OF TORTS § 314B(2) (1965) (indicating 
that an employer owes a duty to protect its employees who foreseeably may be injured while 
acting within the scope of their employment). 
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the ability to enlist.171  The mere existence of such procedures further 
demonstrates the military’s acknowledgement of its duty to protect those 
who have enlisted in the armed forces.172  Therefore, the Air Force owed a 
duty to Gonzalez, among others, to protect her from harm, and should have 
rejected Nazario prior to his enlistment because he had a prior felony 
assault conviction.173
As regulations bound the recruiter to complete an accurate background 
check on all potential enlistees, the military failed in its duty to protect 
those enlisted in the military in the present case.174  Although Nazario 
stated that he had a juvenile charge for fighting, this was false, and the 
recruiter should have taken the time to determine that Nazario actually had 
a felony assault charge on his record.175  Therefore, the failure to fulfill this 
duty gave rise to the plaintiff’s negligence claim against the military.176
The foreseeability of an injurious act is a prerequisite to holding the 
government liable under the proximate cause requirement of a negligence 
claim.177  The Air Force knew that an injury (yet not specifically rape) 
might be possible if it enlisted a person with a criminal record.178  In fact, 
the military has regulations in place to prevent this potentially dangerous 
situation from occurring.179  Although the Air Force could not be certain 
 171. See 10 U.S.C. § 504 (stating that no person who has previously committed a felony 
is qualified to enlist in the military); 32 C.F.R. § 96.1 (requiring the military to complete 
criminal history background checks to ensure the moral quality of all applicants and to bar 
those with criminal records from enlisting). 
 172. See Mulloy v. United States, 937 F. Supp. 1001, 1008-09 (D. Mass. 1996) (stating 
that the military had a duty not to enlist a prior convicted felon, as it should have known of 
his dangerous propensities and because the military had a duty to protect service members 
and their families from harm).  See generally 32 C.F.R. § 96.4 (2004) (indicating that 
regulations require the military to complete accurate background checks on potential 
enlistees). 
 173. See Mulloy, 937 F. Supp. at 1008-09 (finding that the military should not enlist 
foreseeably dangerous persons because it has a duty to protect those within the military from 
harm); see also 10 U.S.C. § 504 (denying enlistment to those with prior felonies on their 
records unless they are specifically waived). 
 174. See Loritts, 489 F. Supp. at 1031-32 (finding that if the military assumes a duty, this 
duty binds the military to act with appropriate care so as to ensure the safety of the 
individuals it is protecting). 
 175. See Nazario, 56 M.J. at 577 (indicating that although Nazario disclosed to the 
recruiter that he had a juvenile conviction for fighting, the recruiter failed to determine the 
accuracy of these statements because he did not investigate the contents of the sealed 
record). 
 176. See Loritts, 489 F. Supp. at 1031-32 (finding that because the military failed to 
provide escorts guaranteed to females visiting the West Point Campus, the military was 
liable for its negligence because its breach directly caused the injury to the plaintiffs). 
 177. See King, 756 F. Supp. at 1360 (arguing that if the military could foresee the danger 
of its actions, yet still took these actions, and an injury occurred, then the behavior is a tort, 
and a court potentially could hold the military liable for its actions). 
 178. See Mulloy, 937 F. Supp. at 1010-11 (explaining that it is foreseeable when 
enlisting a person with a criminal record into the military that this person potentially could 
harm those with whom he comes into contact). 
 179. See 32 C.F.R. § 96.1 (2005) (requiring the military to perform background checks 
28
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 13, Iss. 3 [2005], Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol13/iss3/4
2005] GONZALEZ V. UNITED STATES AIR FORCE 663 
                                                          
that the past commission of a crime is dispositive of the propensity to 
commit future crimes, the regulations act in a preemptive manner to 
attempt to preclude the occurrence of any preventable injury with the goal 
of ensuring the safety of others in the military.180  The military does not 
have to foresee the actual rape, just that there is the chance that a similar 
injury may occur if it enlists a person with dangerous propensities.181  The 
injury the plaintiff in Gonzalez suffered was a potentially foreseeable result 
of the hiring of a person who had a felony assault on his record.182
Since there must be an unbroken chain of causation between the 
negligence alleged and the injury for the government to be liable, it is 
necessary to demonstrate that neither Nazario’s criminal act nor the lapse in 
time qualify as supervening acts that break this chain.183  In Gonzalez, the 
plaintiff’s rape likely would not have occurred but for the government’s 
original negligence in the hiring of Nazario.184  Although the rape itself 
caused the plaintiff’s injury, this act was foreseeable based on the 
government’s original negligence under the third prong of the test, and 
therefore does not qualify as a supervening event.185  In addition, there was 
on potential enlistees in order to prevent the enlistment of those with a felony on their 
record). 
 180. See Dep’t of Defense, Directive 1304.26: Qualification Standards for Enlistment, 
Appointment, and Induction, at 8 (Dec. 21, 1993) [hereinafter Directive 1304.26] (stating 
that the purposes of these regulations are to minimize the enlistment of those who will 
disrupt “good order, morale, and discipline,” and to ensure that the military does not place 
those already enlisted in close contact with persons who have committed serious crimes in 
order to protect their safety), available at 
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/d130426wch1_122193/d130426p. pdf (last 
visited June 1, 2005). 
 181. See King, 756 F. Supp. at 1360 (quoting Ballard v. Uribe, 715 P.2d 624, 629 (Cal. 
1986)) (stating that the military had no duty to foresee that the plaintiff’s husband would 
commit suicide after the plaintiff’s arrest; however, the military should have foreseen that 
the possibility existed for the plaintiff to harm herself).  The court stated that its task was to 
decide whether the plaintiff’s injury was a foreseeable harm from the negligence that 
occurred.  Id. at 1360 n.3. 
 182. See Mulloy, 937 F. Supp. 1009-10 (stating that the military has procedures meant to 
ensure that it does not place prior convicted felons into positions of trust, as it is foreseeable 
that these persons will harm those with whom they come into contact).  See generally 10 
U.S.C. § 504 (1968) (barring the enlistment of all persons who have a prior felony on their 
record).
 183. See Thompson, 652 P.2d at 263-64 (explaining that in order to successfully bring a 
negligence claim, the plaintiff must prove that the negligence was the proximate cause of 
the harm, and stating that the intervention of new forces that were not reasonably 
foreseeable breaks the causal connection). 
 184. See Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 372-73 (indicating that although Nazario directly 
caused the plaintiff’s rape, this injury never would have occurred had the military accurately 
performed its duty and not enlisted Nazario). 
 185. See Thompson, 652 P.2d at 264 (stating that under the third prong of the test, if the 
injury to the plaintiff was not a foreseeable result of the original negligence, then the act 
qualifies as a supervening event); see also Directive 1304.26, supra note 180, at 7-8 
(explaining that the purpose of the regulations barring the enlistment of those with a prior 
felony conviction is to prevent injury from occurring to those in the military due to the 
enlistment of felons).  Cf. Mulloy, 937 F. Supp. at 1012 (finding that both the rape and 
murder of the service member’s wife were a foreseeable result of the military negligently 
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a special relationship between the military and the plaintiff because the 
government had a specific responsibility to protect the plaintiff, and others 
in her position, from preventable harm.186  The government’s affirmative 
act, its negligence in hiring, was the action that exposed the plaintiff to risk 
and, therefore, the government is liable regardless of Nazario’s criminal 
action.187  The rape was, therefore, an intervening force that was a 
foreseeable consequence of the government’s negligence in its hiring of 
Nazario and does not break the chain of causation.188
In Gonzalez, the negligent hiring, although separated significantly in 
time from the moment of the actual injury, does not create a chain of 
causation too attenuated to support a negligence claim.189  There was no 
occurrence during the nine-month period between negligence and injury 
that would cause a break in the chain except for the passage of time.190  
There is no indication that a person who has committed only one felony 
several years ago is no longer foreseeably dangerous after a certain amount 
of time has passed.191  If anything, the presumption within the military falls 
the other way because regulations bar those even with merely one juvenile 
hiring a prior convicted felon). 
 186. See Directive 1304.26, supra note 180, at 8 (indicating that the military has a 
responsibility, which inherently amounts to a special relationship, to prevent enlistees with 
prior felonies on their records from harming others within the military); see also Joyce, 672 
P.2d at 1173-74 (stating that if a special relationship exists between the original actor and 
the potentially injured party, the original actor has a duty to protect those persons from the 
intentional criminal actions of third parties). 
 187. See Nazario, 56 M.J. at 577 (indicating that the military failed in its duty to perform 
accurate background checks on all its enlistees since Nazario had a prior felony on his 
record); see also Joyce, 672 P.2d at 1174 (explaining that if the affirmative action taken by 
the original actor put the plaintiff in the position for a third party to injury the plaintiff, then 
the original actor is liable regardless of the third party’s criminal act). 
 188. See Mulloy, 937 F. Supp. at 1012-13 (stating that rape is a foreseeable consequence 
when the military negligently hires a prior convicted felon); see also Thompson, 652 P.2d at 
263-64 (indicating that an intervening force does not break the causal chain and subject the 
original actor to liability if the intervening force was one that was sufficiently foreseeable 
based on the original act). 
 189. See Brady, 400 F.2d at 357 (explaining that the plaintiff’s claim satisfies proximate 
cause even if there was a significant lapse in time, if the original actor should have foreseen 
that, based on the negligence, an injury could occur, provided that there are no other 
supervening actions).  Cf. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 104 (N.Y. 1928) 
(Andrews, J., dissenting) (explaining that a court cannot significantly separate the injury in 
time from the negligence because, if it does, there is no proximate cause).  However, if there 
is a continuous chain of events between the moment of negligence and the injury, there is no 
remoteness in time.  Id. 
 190. See Nazario, 56 M.J. at 577 (indicating that Nazario approached the military “in the 
fall of 1998” to begin the enlistment process); see also Leigh, 361 P.2d at 854 (explaining 
that because the stability of the roof should have lasted for up to ten years, the mere passage 
of time, absent another force, does not qualify as a supervening act that breaks the chain of 
causation between negligence and injury). 
 191. See Deerings W. Nursing Ctr., Div. of Hillhaven Corp. v. Scott, 787 S.W.2d 494, 
496 (Tex. App. 1990) (inferring that if a person has demonstrated violent tendencies in the 
past, it is likely that he might commit violent acts in the future). 
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felony from enlisting.192  Nor is there an indication that Nazario’s behavior 
changed after nine months of enlistment in order to erase his past proclivity 
towards violent behavior.193  As the military knew or should have known of 
the potential for injury if it enlisted a person who has a propensity for 
violence, this satisfies proximate cause.194  Therefore, in Gonzalez, the 
military is liable because it breached its affirmative duty to complete an 
accurate background check on Nazario in order to ensure the safety of its 
enlisted members, and this breach was the reasonably foreseeable cause of 
the plaintiff’s rape.195
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of the FTCA is to provide federal employees an avenue of 
redress against the United States Government in instances where private 
employees would be able to bring a negligence suit against their private 
employers.196  However, the Feres Doctrine limits this access and has 
prevented the majority of cases from ever reaching an appropriate, let alone 
desirable remedy, because courts tend to dismiss the claims of active duty 
service members on a jurisdictional technicality without ever reaching the 
merits of the cases.197  Congress or the judicial branch needs to confine the 
Feres Doctrine to its originally intended limits in order to provide a more 
acceptable remedy to plaintiffs, such as the plaintiff in Gonzalez.198  
Furthermore, courts should not hide the military’s negligence in enlisting a 
potentially dangerous member of the armed forces behind a doctrine that 
 192. See 32 C.F.R. § 96.3 (2005) (stating that criminal history checks apply to all 
enlistees’ convictions or citations, both juvenile and adult). 
 193. See Nazario, 56 M.J. at 577 (failing to state if there was anything that occurred 
during the nine-month period between enlistment and rape that would indicate that he no 
longer had the ability to commit violent acts). 
 194. See Mulloy, 937 F. Supp. at 1012 (explaining that the perpetrator’s enlistment 
proximately caused the rape and death of the plaintiff’s wife because, had the military not 
allowed him to enlist, he would not have been able to attack the service member’s wife).  
Therefore, there was a causal connection between the military’s negligent hiring and the 
wife’s injury.  Id.; see also Brady, 400 F.2d at 357 (finding that when the original actor 
should have foreseen the potential for injury to the plaintiff at the time of the negligence, 
absent another supervening force, proximate cause is satisfied). 
 195. See Mulloy, 937 F. Supp. at 1014 (stating that when the military owes a duty to a 
member of the military community, the military breaches this duty when it negligently 
enlists a prior convicted felon).  Furthermore, when that person injures another, and this 
injury is foreseeable, a court can hold the military liable.  Id. 
 196. See Senger, 103 F.3d at 1441 (explaining that a purpose for and rationale behind the 
FTCA is to allow plaintiffs to have broad redress in federal district courts). 
 197. See, e.g., Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 375 (dismissing the plaintiff’s claim for lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction under the Feres Doctrine without addressing the actual merits 
of the claim). 
 198. See supra notes 152-169 and accompanying text (arguing that the Ninth Circuit’s 
interpretation of the assault and battery exception would better allow plaintiffs to find relief 
in the court system because it focuses on the negligence alleged, not on the negligence that 
resulted in an assault and battery). 
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courts never intended to be so broad.199
The majority’s interpretation of the assault and battery exception 
frustrates the purpose behind the FTCA because courts apply it so broadly 
as to envelop within the exception even those assault and battery cases that 
truly stem from a prior negligent act.200  Given the appropriate opportunity, 
the Supreme Court should resolve the discrepancies between the circuits 
regarding negligent hiring claims in favor of the Ninth Circuit’s minority 
position in order to provide potential plaintiffs with a fair remedy.201
As the Third Circuit has stated, “the facts pleaded here, if true, cry out 
for a remedy.”202  A service member should feel unthreatened by fellow 
service members while serving in the military and safe from violent crimes, 
such as rape.203  Rape should not be occurring as frequently as it is within 
the military. 204  The strongest way to prevent this is to allow courts to 
adjudicate these claims, because that is at least one true way to protect 
order within the military. 
 199. See Persons, 925 F.2d at 296 n.7 (explaining that courts have broadened the Feres 
Doctrine to encompass every claim even slightly related to military service). 
 200. See Shearer, 473 U.S. at 54-55 (barring not only claims that arise directly from an 
assault or battery, but also negligence claims that have their roots in an assault or battery). 
 201. Compare id. (granting broad immunity to the government by barring any claim that 
stems from an assault or battery), with Senger, 103 F.3d at 1441-42 (allowing plaintiffs to 
bring claims arising out of an assault or battery if the basis of the claim was a negligent act 
or omission on the part of a government employee). 
 202. Peluso v. United States, 474 F.2d 605, 606 (3d Cir. 1973) (stating that the decision 
in Feres binds the court, and precedent demonstrates that the Supreme Court is unlikely to 
overturn Feres because the Court continues to refuse to grant certiorari to cases involving 
this doctrine). 
 203. See generally 10 U.S.C. § 504 (1968) (indicating that there are regulations that 
prohibit the enlistment of persons with a felony on their criminal record).
 204. See Gonzalez, 88 Fed. Appx. at 371 (demonstrating that a fellow service member 
raped the plaintiff, yet barring her claim because she was on active duty at the time of the 
injury); see also Shiver, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 322-23 (demonstrating that the plaintiff’s drill 
sergeant raped her, yet leaving her without redress within the civilian courts); Corey, 1997 
U.S. App. LEXIS 22258, at *3-5 (showing that the plaintiff’s Colonel raped her); Stubbs, 
744 F.2d at 59 (stating that the plaintiff’s sergeant sexually harassed her, and left the 
plaintiff so distraught over her lack of remedy that it caused her suicide).  See generally 
supra note 79 (indicating the numerous occurrences of sexual assault and harassment within 
the military). 
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